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Abstract: 
A growing number of countries have granted their emigrant citizens the right to vote in 
homeland elections from afar. Yet, there is little understanding of the extent to which 
emigration issues are visible in the subsequent legislative processes of policy making 
and representation. Based on an original dataset of parliamentary activities in Spain, 
Italy, France and Romania, this paper analyses why political parties pay attention to 
emigrants. To that end we propose a conceptual framework which draws on both 
theories of issue salience and substantive representation. Bridging these two 
frameworks allows us bring in both parties (salience) and constituencies 
(representation) in the analysis of the linkage between electorates and parliaments at a 
transnational level. We test a series of hypothesis and find that parties are more likely to 
focus on emigration issues the stronger their electoral incentives and in the context of 
electoral systems allowing the emigrants to elect special emigrant representatives.  
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Introduction 
Parties and parliaments are facing the challenge of how to deal with an increasingly 
mobile electorate. The last decades have witnessed an exponential growth of the number 
of countries that extend citizenship rights to national citizens who reside abroad 
(Rhodes & Harutyunyan 2010). These rights include welfare assistance, support for 
cultural activities and absentee voting rights. Indeed, in 2007 no less than 115 countries 
allowed emigrants to vote in elections in their countries of origin (Ellis et al. 2007). This 
incorporation of emigrants in the politics of their country of origin challenges classical 
notions of territorial democratic representation.  
 
Studies of these phenomena mainly focus on identifying the normative and empirical 
underpinnings of why countries grant external citizenship to their non-resident citizens 
(Bauböck 2007; Waldinger & Soehl 2013; Lafleur 2012). In contrast, there is little 
understanding of the extent to which external voting rights, paraphrasing Pitkin (1967), 
render the absent emigrants present in the subsequent processes of policy making and 
representation (but see, Collyer 2014; Lafleur 2012). Given the dominant trend of 
enfranchising emigrants it is therefore timely to further probe into the transnational 
dynamics of the representative linkage between non-resident citizens and their 
homeland parliaments. What is the general level of attention to emigrant issues in 
homeland parliaments? And why are some political parties more concerned than others?  
 
Issue salience and substantive representation are two of the main theoretical approaches 
employed in the study of parliamentary activities. Although issue salience has mainly 
been applied to the study of electoral campaigns, a growing body of research argues that 
this theoretical approach is also suitable for the study of party behaviour in parliaments 
 4 
(Green-Pedersen 2010; Vliegenthart & Walgrave 2011). According to salience theories, 
parties emphasize those issues that that they ‘own’ or that give them an advantage in the 
eyes of the electorate (Budge & Farlie 1983; Laver 2001; Pogorelis et al. 2005; Green-
Pedersen 2010). However, studies of issue salience rarely include the significance of the 
relationship between parties and particular local or socially based constituencies such as 
those of immigrants or emigrants.  
 
The second approach is related to theories of substantive representation and policy 
responsiveness and centre on individual MPs and their focus on their local constituency 
or special constituents such as immigrants. Representation theories explain how and 
why MPs focus on social groups such as women, minorities, immigrants and, broadly 
speaking, ‘local constituents’. This approach offers meaningful insights into the 
representative link between emigrant constituencies and their special representatives 
(Heitshusen et al. 2005; Martin 2011; Saalfeld 2011). However, this representative link 
does not only relate to individual MPs, but is also one of the main democratic linkages 
between parties and citizens (Dalton et al. 2011). Given that representation theories do 
not fully engage with how and why parties link up with constituency issues beyond the 
individual level of the MPs, they cannot explain why homeland political parties focus 
on emigration in parliamentary contexts without special emigrant representatives.  
 
Building on both sets of theories, the initial assumption of this paper is that emigrants 
possessing external citizenship rights constitute both an issue and a group of voters for 
homeland political parties. While all parties in the homeland parliament may have a 
position regarding emigration, not all of them dedicate the same amount of attention to 
emigrant related issues and demands. We propose that a framework combining issue 
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salience and substantive representation approaches can explain transnational dynamics 
of salience and representation of emigrants. In turn, this contributes to the 
understanding of how to bridge studies of salience of constituency issues with studies of 
the representation linkages between parties and constituencies. 
 
In the empirical part of the paper, we analyse variation in how much political parties 
emphasize emigration related issues based on an original dataset of parliamentary 
questions and legislative proposals in four countries: France, Italy, Spain and Romania. 
These four countries all have sizeable groups of citizens abroad, but their systems of 
external voting rights differ. Spain, like most countries with external voting rights, 
counts the emigrant vote as part of the general pool of votes in the constituency of their 
last residence in the country of origin. France, Romania and Italy belong to the small 
but growing number of countries (only 13) in which the citizens living abroad elect their 
own emigrant representatives to the parliament of their country of origin (Collyer 2014). 
In these electoral systems the emigrants constitute a separate external constituency 
which is divided into electoral districts for which a determined number of parliamentary 
seats are reserved.  
 
We test a series of hypothesis related to the electoral support of emigrants in homeland 
elections, the ideology of parties, the particular electoral system in place and the 
dynamics of competition for the emigrant vote. Our main findings show that 
transnational dynamics of representation and issue salience are not so different from the 
dynamics at the national level despite the volatility and unpredictability of the emigrant 
vote. Parties are more likely to pay attention to emigrant issues in political systems with 
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special emigrant representation and when they receive stronger electoral support from 
the emigrants.  
 
Emigration salience and the representative link in homeland parliaments 
This section discusses the extent to which we can bring back in parties when explaining 
why parliaments pay attention to issues such as local and regional constituencies or 
social groups such as emigrants, immigrant voters or national minorities.  
 
Homeland parliaments and emigration salience 
Issue salience is defined as the relative emphasis given to an issue by political parties in 
public discourses, electoral campaigns or parliaments (Budge & Farlie 1983; Laver 
2001; Rohrschneider & Whitefield 2008; Green-Pedersen 2010). Unlike spatial models 
of party competition, salience theory predicts that parties compete by emphasizing 
(making salient) issues that are favourable to them or which are perceived as ‘owned’ 
by them (Budge 2001; Laver 2001). The relationship between issue salience and issue 
position is an ongoing discussion. On the one hand, Budge (2001) suggests that the 
general left-right placement of parties is subject to the particular emphasis on issues in 
party manifestos. Other studies argue for a further separation of the position and 
salience of parties (Laver 2001; Pogorelis et al. 2005; Bélanger & Meguid 2008). In this 
view, salience denotes the sum of all positions regarding an issue (neutral, pro or 
against), while position refers to the substantive view of the party on a specific issue. In 
this paper we adopt the notion of salience as largely separate from position given that 
we are identifying the amount of attention parties give to emigration rather than their 
fundamental position on emigration related policies.  
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Research on issue salience has identified several explanations for why parties tend to 
emphasise some issues rather than others. A basic tenet is that the vote-seeking 
strategies of parties lead them to accentuate issues that make them look good in the eyes 
of the voters in comparison to the opponent (Petrocik 1996; Budge & Farlie 1983; 
Laver 2001). This type of behaviour leads to issue ownership in the long run. An 
underlying element of the vote-seeking motivation is related to the catering to a 
particular voter support base (Petrocik 1996; Pogorelis et al. 2005).  
 
In the case of emigrant voters, the identification of core supporters is a challenge for 
homeland political parties. As noted in other studies of external voting rights it is more 
costly to mobilize an external electorate dispersed in several countries (Ellis et al. 2007; 
Lafleur 2012). Moreover, the political preferences of the external electorate are largely 
un-polled in between elections. However, if a party identifies the emigrant collectives as 
a part of its electoral support base, then it has a stronger incentive to maintain and 
establish a link with the external voters who then again are more likely to vote for that 
party. Hence, parties which receive a larger share of emigrant votes are likely to pay 
more attention to emigration issues than parties which receive a marginal support (H1). 
 
Ideology is another important determinant of issue salience. There are certain issues that 
are closer to a specific party ideology and which are owned by parties both during 
electoral campaigns and their parliamentary activities. However, not all ideologically 
important issues are related to a particular social group of voters, nor are all issues 
linked to a particular ideology (Pogorelis et al. 2005). For instance, recent research 
disputes the role of leftist parties being the main party emphasizing immigrant related 
issues (Alonso & Fonseca 2012). The link between emigration and ideology is still to be 
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further explored. Joppke (2003) argues that while leftist parties have historically pushed 
for reforms in favour of immigrant inclusion, the rights of non-resident emigrant 
citizens have been the promoted by the political right. Yet, an inclusive position towards 
emigrants among right-wing parties does not exclude that leftist parties pay attention to 
emigration issues. Since the salience of the issue of emigration is not necessarily the 
same as a positioning on emigration, it is relevant to explore if right-wing parties are 
indeed dedicating the largest amount of attention to emigration issues. We therefore test 
if right-wing parties are more likely than left-wing parties to emphasize emigration 
issues in their parliamentary activities (H2).  
 
Homeland parliaments and emigrant representation 
Emigrants are both an issue and a group of voters with different arrangements of 
representation across political systems. However, one limitation of the issue salience 
literature in parliamentary contexts is that it prioritizes the electoral link between parties 
and voters over the link between parties and constituencies. The focus on constituency 
interests occupies an important proportion of MPs’ legislative and non-legislative 
activities but it remains unexplored at the level of parties (Martin 2011; Green-Pedersen 
& Mortensen 2010; Heitshusen et al. 2005). It is therefore relevant to further explore 
why parties put different emphases on issues that correspond to a specific group of 
voters, interest groups or local constituencies. 
 
The answer to this question comes to a large extent from the substantive representation 
literature, even though most of this research focuses on individual MP behaviour 
(Powell 2004; Celis 2008; Bird et al. 2010; Saalfeld & Bischof 2012). These studies 
argue that factors such as the electoral system and constituency-related electoral 
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incentives tend to determine the representative behaviour of MPs and the extent to 
which they emphasise constituency-related issues in legislative and non-legislative 
activities.  
 
In terms of constituency-related electoral incentives, the marginality hypothesis 
suggests that MPs elected by a narrow margin tend to pay closer attention to the 
interests of their constituency (Griffin 2006; Fiorina 1973; Cox & Munger 1989; 
Matsusaka 1993). Drawing on this literature, we expect that the relationship between 
closer electoral races and the subsequent representation of interests will also be 
reproduced in the case of party focus on emigrant issues. For instance, there are 
examples of the emigrant vote being decisive in Romanian presidential elections, Italian 
legislative elections and Spanish regional elections over the past decade (Østergaard-
Nielsen & Ciornei 2013). It is plausible therefore that the competing parties are more 
likely to emphasize emigration issues in the next legislative period when the emigrant 
vote is won with a close margin (H3).  
 
Another set of explanations centre on the electoral system. Comparative studies of 
electoral systems have found that differences in type of ballot impact the representation 
strategies of parties (Farrell & Scully 2005). These studies distinguish between 
majoritarian and proportional electoral systems and degrees of openness of the ballot 
design and compare the subsequent level of constituency engagement of MPs. The 
openness of the ballot is a variable that takes into account both the degree to which the 
voters may have a say in who is elected and if the ballot is candidate-based or party 
based. The overall suggestion is that majoritarian plurality systems or systems with an 
open party lists favour a ‘personal vote’ rendering MPs more prone to create a 
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representative linkage with the voters (Heitshusen et al. 2005; Patzelt 2007; Mcleay & 
Vowles 2007).  
 
The special representation arrangements for emigrants take different forms and 
therefore cannot be placed in a clear-cut category. Nevertheless, a plurality electoral 
system is more comparable to electoral systems where emigrants elect special emigrant 
representatives than to the cases where the external electorate votes in a homeland 
constituency, especially if the homeland electoral system is based on closed lists. In 
electoral systems with special emigrant representatives, the emigrants belong to a 
clearly delimitated constituency and their representatives are likely to have more 
incentives to nurture the connection with the constituents than otherwise. The extent to 
which special emigrant representatives are concerned with emigrant constituent issues is 
likely to inform the agenda of their parties in parliament. In turn, this attention can spill 
over to heightened awareness among the rest of the parties. Consequently, it is expected 
that in contexts with special emigrant representation, emigration issues are more 
present in party parliamentary activities than in those contexts without special emigrant 
representation (H4).  
 
The electoral system is expected not only to have a direct impact on the variation of 
emigration salience among parties, but also to moderate the significance of electoral 
incentives such as electoral support and closeness of the race. Thus, if the emigrant vote 
is counted among the domestic vote, it does not necessarily constitute an incentive for 
increased party focus on emigrant issues. Parties may not have enough resources to 
dedicate to the (marginal) proportion of emigrant voters when domestic constituencies 
are large and complex. In those cases, incentives such as gaining an emigrant social 
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base or winning in close races among emigrants may only lead to small benefits. It is 
therefore likely that the effect of high levels of support among the emigrant electorate is 
stronger in contexts with special emigrant representation (H5). Following a similar 
reasoning, it is likely that that the effect of high levels of electoral competition among 
the emigrant electorate is stronger in contexts with special emigrant representation 
(H6). 
 
The case selection 
The subsequent analysis tests the abovementioned hypotheses by looking at the 
legislative and non-legislative activities of political parties in the national parliaments of 
Spain, France and Romania and Italy. These cases are mainly chosen because they 
differ in terms of the type of external electoral system, which is one of the core 
explanatory variables of this study. We compare the parties in Italy with directly elected 
emigrant representatives in both chambers with Spain where the emigrant citizens cast 
their votes in the last constituency of residence. To this contrast we add France which 
until 2012 only had indirectly elected special emigrant representatives in the Senate and 
Romania which changed to special representation in 2008 (see Table 1). Because of the 
French case we choose to compare chambers of parliament rather than whole 
parliaments.1 The time frame analysed for Spain is 2000-2011, for France it is 1997-
2012 and for Romania it is 2000-2012. This time period covers three legislatures, except 
in the case of Italy where we can only include the last two legislatures (2006-2013) 
when emigrants had long-distance voting rights.  
 
The four countries all have sizeable numbers of emigrants residing abroad, but the 
geographical spread vary (see table 1). The information on the characteristics of the 
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different emigrant groups is sparse and they are unlikely to be homogeneous. For 
instance, the overall profile of the Spanish and Italian emigrants is likely to be more 
mixed as second, and third generation Spanish citizens join the pool of external voters. 
The Romanian voters are, especially in the period under scrutiny, fairly unknown to the 
political parties.  
 
Moreover, Spain and France have a long trajectory of voting rights for emigrants 
(France at the presidential level and through electoral colleges for the Senate), while the 
first elections with long-distance voting in Italy and Romania were celebrated in 2006 
and 2001 respectively (Ellis et al. 2007). The systems of registration and voting 
modalities differ across the countries which has an important impact on the turnout. 
Notably, the Romanian emigrants are estimated to have an extremely low turnout which 
likely relates to the fact that until 2016 Romanian external voters could only vote in 
person at the consulates and embassies whereas the other three emigrant nationalities 
have the possibility of postal voting and voting by proxy (Østergaard-Nielsen & Ciornei 
2013). The political profile of these emigrants is also different. Past electoral results 
reveal a stable pattern of centre-right voting in the case of French emigrant voters, and 
centre-left voting in the case of Italian emigrant voters. In the cases of Romania and 
Spain the voting pattern is volatile (Lugilde 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen & Ciornei 2013). 
Indeed, the Spanish emigrants have always voted for the incumbent government, going 
against the domestic support for the opposition in 1996, 2004, and 2011 (with a very 
small margin in the latter election).2 Consequently, Spanish parties cannot take their 
emigrant electoral support for granted.  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
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Data and methods 
Measuring party emphasis on emigration related issues 
The unit of analysis is the number of questions and legislative proposals respectively 
per party per chamber during a legislature. We include all parties with parliamentary 
representation during our period of study. We have chosen parliamentary questions and 
legislative proposals as the two main indicators to estimate the degree of salience of 
emigration issues among parties.3 Other researchers have argued that the volume of 
parliamentary questions is a relevant indicator of issue salience and constituency focus 
among political parties and MPs because they indicate which issues grasp the attention 
of the political representatives (Martin 2011; Saalfeld 2011; Saalfeld & Bischof 2012; 
Green-Pedersen 2010; Russo 2011). It is important to emphasize that we focus on 
visibility of emigrant related issues and therefore include also questions and legislation 
on, for example, raising taxes and administrative consular fees for expatriates, that are 
not necessarily welcomed by the emigrants themselves. In addition we analyse the 
determinants of emigration salience in legislative proposals. Legislative proposals are 
more time-consuming to prepare and attract more attention from external actors such as 
media, voters or competitor parties. Consequently parliamentary proposals constitute a 
stronger commitment and indicator of party attention to emigration. In order to 
differentiate between government emigration policy and parliamentary focus on 
emigration, we chose only legislative proposals from the floor. While the former can be 
an indicator of the concern with emigration of ruling parties, they are not fully 
comparable to proposals made by elected representatives who have fewer resources for 
preparation of proposals at their disposal.  
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We searched for emigration related parliamentary questions and legislative proposals 
made by each party. In order to identify the questions and legislative proposals related 
to emigrants we used key search words that refer to emigrants and emigration in the 
online search engines of the respective chambers (table 2). The choice of these 
keywords was based on a previous survey of the legal texts and political discourses on 
the topic over the last two decades.  
 
Table 2. Examples of keywords used in the search on emigration questions and 
initiatives 
  
France Italy Romania Spain English 
français à 
l’étranger, 
français 
établis 
hors de 
France 
  
italiani 
all’estero 
  
 
romani din 
afara 
granitelor, 
romani de 
pretutindeni,  
romani din 
strainatate,  
strainatate 
 
españoles en el 
exterior,   
residentes 
ausentes 
French abroad, French living outside of 
France, Italians abroad, Romanians abroad, 
Romanians outside borders, abroad, 
Spaniards abroad, absent residents,  
For all countries: emigrants, diaspora, 
citizens abroad , residents abroad,  
French/Italians/Romanians/Spaniards +  ‘residing 
in’  or ‘in the world’ or ‘in  + top five 
destination countries’.   
Main councils/departments for emigrants in 
each country. 
 
We revised all entries and discarded those unrelated to emigration issues.4 Based on a 
pre-established list of codes, we coded their content and summed up the total numbers 
of both relevant questions/interpellations and legislative proposals per party per 
chamber in each legislature. 5 In terms of content, we coded all emigration related 
questions and legislative proposals from the latest legislature in each country. Based on 
previous studies on external citizenship, we established a list of categories related to the 
literature on socio-economic, identity and electoral dimensions of external citizenship 
(Bauböck 2007; Tintori 2012) as well as a screening of questions. Subsequently, we 
divided the questions into six broad categories: external voting, culture and education 
(cultural activities and programmes, emigrant associative sector, education and training 
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supported by the state of origin), transnational welfare and protection (pensions, 
subsidies, financial help to poor emigrants, administrative concerns), fiscal issues (such 
as taxes, remittances, loans), nationality, social impact in the home country and return 
(impact for emigrant families, brain drain, return measures). A seventh category called 
‘other’ refers to other topics that were not deemed frequent enough to merit a category 
of their own. 
 
Determinants of party emphasis on emigration related issues  
Emigrant electoral support is a continuous variable representing the percentage of 
emigrant votes a party received in the election before each legislature, measured on a 0-
100 scale. Although the variable on voter support is temporally prior to the legislative 
activities under scrutiny, the causality between emigrant electoral support and party 
emphasis on emigrant issues cannot be determined in this analysis. However, the 
correlation between these two variables is interesting in and of itself in a transnational 
electoral field with an often volatile emigrant vote. Since there is no special 
representation of Spaniards abroad, the variable is calculated as the share of votes 
received from abroad by a party over the total number of votes from abroad. In the case 
of France, emigrants did not vote in legislative elections until 2012 and we therefore use 
the results of the presidential elections to measure emigrant voter preferences for 
political parties in the National Assembly. In the case of the French Senate we use the 
results of the indirect elections of emigrant senators through the 155 member electoral 
college for emigrants (Assemble de Francais a l’Etranger/Assembly of French 
Abroad).6 
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We measure ideology on a continuous scale from 1 (left) to 10 (right) according to the 
data available in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) database.7 The closeness of the 
electoral competition is operationalized as a continuous variable that measures the 
difference in percentages between the first and second most voted parties among 
emigrant voters. The smaller the difference of votes, the larger is the closeness of the 
electoral competition. The variable related to the system of special representation for 
emigrants is a dummy that takes the value 1 when the system recognizes a special 
emigrant constituency and 0 otherwise. 
 
Control variables 
It may be the case that only large national parties, which have the resources to establish 
an enduring connection with the emigrant communities, are at the same time their 
advocates in the national parliaments. We therefore control for the size of the party in 
each of the parliamentary chambers. The variable is calculated as the percentage of seats 
of the respective party or group in the chamber (0-100 scale). Moreover, we control if 
the party is in government with the party in government taking the value of 1 and 
opposition parties taking the value of 0. We expect that parties in government are less 
likely to submit private members’ bills. We also control if the impact of ideology is 
stronger in systems of special representation. This type of representation may strengthen 
the visibility and endurance of the ideological link between parties and external voters 
since parties’ activities are easier communicated to and evaluated by the external 
constituents. Since the variation in parties’ attention to emigration issue is influenced by 
contextual factors such as parliamentary traditions and the overall volume of questions 
and legislative proposals in one national parliament or chamber, we introduce country 
dummies and chamber dummies. 8 In order to address the temporal dimension of the 
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study, we control for the particular legislature in which the question or legislative 
proposal was introduced. 
  
 
Methods 
In order to analyse the data we estimate negative binomial models. Negative binomial 
models are recommended in order to handle over dispersed data where the variance is 
higher than the mean (Hilbe 2011) and have previously been used in the analysis of 
parliamentary activities on other issues such as immigration (Saalfeld & Bischof 2012). 
In our dataset, the average number of questions per party is 19.45 with a standard 
deviation of 52.71. A similar data pattern is reproduced in each of the countries studied. 
In the case of legislative proposals, the average for all countries is 2.30 with a standard 
deviation of 5.28. The percentage of emigration questions and initiatives over the total 
number of questions and initiatives respectively made by a party also displays a high 
level of dispersion. Given that negative binomial models can only handle count data we 
discard using the percentage of emigration questions as our dependent variable.  
 
 
Findings 
Emigration salience in homeland parliaments 
External voting has received widespread interest in the literature on citizenship. Yet, 
with the exception of the Spanish Senate, this issue occupies a relatively small part of 
emigration related parliamentary questions (Figure 1). The salience of external voting in 
Spain is related to especially the opposition’s concern with fraud in the emigrant voter 
registration, resulting in the 2011 law on tighter registration requirements and the 
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abolishment of external voting rights in local elections. Romania, France and Italy also 
experienced debates and parliamentary questions regarding the electoral integrity of the 
vote from abroad. Arguments related to the district boundaries of the French 
constituencies and the risk of fraud in the proposed postal voting systems in Romania or 
the ongoing postal voting system in Italy are examples of some of the issues that 
dominated parliamentary questions and declarations within this area.  
 
An important part of the parliamentary questions concerns the transnational welfare and 
protection of emigrants. This includes issues of social and financial assistance for 
emigrants in need and improvement of consular services. Topics related to culture and 
education occupy, between a fifth and a fourth of emigration related questions in each 
country. Issues of return and social impact of emigration are questioned by especially 
Spanish and Romanian parliamentarians. In the case of Spain, this is related to changes 
in the nationality laws in the mid-2000, which facilitated return migration of second and 
third generation Spanish nationals from especially Latin American countries. In the 
context of more recent emigration in Romania, concerns with the ‘children left behind’ 
by the emigrated parents or the brain drain in several economic sectors are examples of 
questions in this category. Italian and French parliamentarians have paid most attention 
to the issue of the emigrant ‘tax payer’. This includes concern with tax evasion and 
expatriates’ financial duties (property or income taxes) or entitlements (bank accounts, 
transactions). Curiously Romania, the worlds’ 10th largest recipient of remittances 
(World Bank 2008), has witnessed little debate on this topic. The questions on the 
emigrant taxpayer and the integrity of the external vote illustrate that attention to 
emigrants can be critical and evolve around restricting rights and expanding obligations 
to the homeland.  
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Legislative proposals follow a somewhat different dynamic than parliamentary 
questions (Figure 2). The external vote dominates the attention of especially French and 
Italian parliamentarians. These proposals focus on the improvement of registration and 
voting procedure in order to avoid fraud and gerrymandering, and also on the reform of 
non-electoral representation bodies such as the Assembly of French Abroad (AFE) or 
the Committees for the Italians Abroad. Proposals related to transnational welfare 
receive attention in all countries except for Romania. This finding is most likely 
explained by the recent character of the Romanian migration and patterns of circular 
and temporary migration. Culture and education as well as fiscal issues are salient areas 
for especially Italian and Romanian deputies. 
 
Figure 1. Emigration related parliamentary questions by country and chamber during 
the latest legislature 
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Figure 2: Emigration related legislative proposals by country and chamber during the 
latest legislature. 
 
 
Emigration salience and special representation 
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introduction of special emigrant representatives in the latest legislature (see table 3). In 
terms of legislative proposals the number increases in all cases except Spain.  
 
The extent to which special emigrant representatives are responsible for the attention to 
emigrants varies across cases. The representation of the French abroad is almost entirely 
carried out by the emigrant senators, which have a long-standing tenure in the French 
Senate. However, in contexts with more recent representation arrangements such as 
Italy and Romania the proportion of questions and initiatives made by emigrant 
representatives varies between 11 and 81 percent and with significant variation across 
the chambers and parties. The extent to which and why emigrant representative ‘take 
over’ the issue of emigration is worthy of further investigation. For now we note that in 
Romania and Italy there is a much less stable pattern of emigrant issue delegation than 
in the case of France. Emigration continues to be a salient issue for the party rather than 
an area that is exclusively carried out by the elected MPs. 
 Table 3. Number of emigration related questions per chamber and special representatives  
 
Country Chamber Legislature I Legislature II Legislature III 
Spain Total Congress 160 116 92 	  	   Total Senate 241 50 33 
Romania Total Chamber of Deputies 12 76 98 	  	   % by special emigrant representatives     23.47 
France Total National Assembly 82 192 81 	  	   Total Senate 626 654 438 	  	   % by special emigrant representatives 77.32 91.28 88.58 
Italy Total Chamber of Deputies   110 268 	  	   % by special emigrant representatives   54.55 67.91 	  	   Total Senate   30 64 	  	   % by special emigrant representatives   43.33 34.38 
 
 
Table 4. Number of emigration related legislative proposals per chamber and special representatives 
Country Chamber Legislature I Legislature II Legislature III 
Spain Total Congress 24 9 10 
Romania Total Chamber of Deputies 2 8 15 
  % by special emigrant representatives     40.00 
France Total National Assembly   5 15 
  Total Senate 8 20 33 
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  % by special emigrant representatives 62.5 100 100 
Italy Total Chamber of Deputies   36 82 
  % by special emigrant representatives   80.55 74.39 
  Total Senate   9 30 
  % by special emigrant representatives   11.11 40 
 
Determinants of emigration salience in parliamentary questions  
In order to test the hypotheses proposed we present four sets of negative binomial 
regressions which test the relevance of emigrant electoral support, party competition 
and an electoral system of emigrant representation for the number of emigration 
questions proposed by each party (per chamber) in one legislature (table 5). Model 1 
tests the impact of explanatory variables without interaction terms and shows that the 
electoral system and electoral support among emigrant voters are significant predictors 
for the variation of emigrant issue salience on party agendas. Electoral support by 
emigrants is a factor that is positively correlated with the salience of emigration in 
parties’ non-legislative activities, confirming H1. One percentage increase in emigrant 
votes increases the log-odds of making emigration related questions by 0.044. In 
incidence ratios (not shown here), the rate for emigration related questions would be 
expected to increase by a factor of 1.04 while holding all other variables in the model 
constant and increasing the emigrant vote for one party by one per cent.  
 
In terms of the connection between party ideology and emigration, the coefficient of the 
variable ideology is not statistically significant. This suggests that parties placed on the 
right are not necessarily more attentive to emigrant issues in parliamentary questions, 
contradicting H2. This finding can be interpreted in various ways. As suggested by 
previous studies (Joppke 2003; Tintori 2012) centre right parties may be drivers of 
emigrant enfranchisement and more inclusive reforms of electoral regulations regarding 
the vote from abroad. However, our dataset includes a broader set of issues such as 
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transnational welfare, culture or education, which may be closer to the general agenda 
of centre left parties. Further studies, which break down the content of the questions 
across the different legislatures, are needed in order to confirm this interpretation. In 
terms of the electoral system, the results confirm that an electoral system with special 
representation has a positive effect on party attention to emigration issues (H4). The 
introduction of special representation arrangements for external citizens has a strong 
impact on emigration salience on homeland party agenda, as it increases the incidence 
ratio of emigration related parliamentary questions by a factor of 7.27. 
 
Models 2-4 test if an electoral system with special emigrant representatives modifies the 
impact and significance of electoral incentives (such as emigrant support and closeness 
of electoral competition) and ideology. The interaction between the electoral system and 
emigrant electoral support is not significant rendering H5 not confirmed. This means 
that parties that are better placed among emigrants’ preferences also become their 
advocates in homeland parliaments regardless of the type of electoral system.  
Table 5. Determinants of volume of emigration related parliamentary questions. Negative binomial 
coefficients with robust standard errors.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Emigrant electoral 
support 
0.044*** 0.046*** 0.041*** 0.044*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
Ideology  -0.007 -0.007 -0.016 -0.010 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.114) 
Closeness of electoral 
competition 
-0.006 -0.006 0.030* -0.006 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) 
Special representation  1.984*** 2.104*** 3.815*** 1.956* 
 (0.387) (0.574) (0.783) (0.802) 
Special representation# 
Emigrant electoral 
support 
 -0.006   
  (0.015)   
Special representation# 
Closeness of electoral 
competition 
  -0.083**  
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   (0.030)  
Special representation# 
Ideology 
   0.006 
    (0.144) 
Size of party 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Party in government -0.191* -0.194* -0.162* -0.191* 
 (0.088) (0.089) (0.076) (0.088) 
Senate -0.576* -0.579* -0.626* -0.575* 
 (0.309) (0.312) (0.320) (0.297) 
     
Legislature II -0.406* -0.398* -0.596* -0.404* 
 (0.226) (0.227) (0.243) (0.227) 
Legislature III -0.399 -0.384 -1.076*** -0.398 
 (0.308) (0.308) (0.284) (0.310) 
Spain 0.082 0.084 0.037 0.081 
 (0.388) (0.392) (0.368) (0.385) 
Romania -0.556 -0.570 -0.969* -0.552 
 (0.546) (0.551) (0.471) (0.545) 
Italy -1.243* -1.316* -1.892*** -1.243* 
 (0.492) (0.520) (0.551) (0.493) 
Constant 1.090** 1.067** 1.012** 1.102* 
 (0.381) (0.385) (0.384) (0.517) 
Alpha 0.476* 0.474* 0.419* 0.476* 
 (0.186) (0.186) (0.199) (0.186) 
Observations 173 173 173 173 
AIC 1005.714 1007.572 1000.335 1007.711 
BIC 1049.860 1054.872 1047.634 1055.011 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Base categories: Legislature: Legislature I; Country: France 
 *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
As Model 3 indicates, the interaction between the closeness of the electoral competition 
and special representation is significant. This means that closer electoral races have a 
stronger effect on party attention to emigrant issues in electoral systems with special 
representatives than in those where the external vote is counted in a domestic 
constituency. This finding confirms H6. For a better interpretation of this result, we 
calculate the predicted number of questions in contexts with/without special 
representation and different degrees of electoral competition. In systems with special 
representation the number of emigration related questions decreases from 103 to 36 
when the distance between the two most voted parties increases from five percent  to 25 
percent. In contexts without special representation the closeness of the results has an 
opposite effect, albeit much smaller. The number of questions changes from 11 to 20 
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when the distance between the most voted parties increases from five percent to 25 
percent.  
 
Regarding the control variables, all models show that the size of the party in one 
chamber has a strong significant effect on emigration salience. This finding shows that 
it is the larger, and by extension more resourceful parties, which are more likely to 
focus on emigration issues. Moreover, given the combination of a government 
dominated legislative process and party discipline, participation in government 
decreases the share of emigration related questions made by one party in the four sets of 
multivariate regressions. As Model 4 shows, the impact of ideology remains 
insignificant and uniform across cases, irrespective of the type of electoral system in 
place. As predicted, parties in the upper chambers are less likely to ask emigration 
related questions in comparison to their counterparts in the lower chambers. This 
finding is explained by the fact that across our countries of study, the upper chambers 
have fewer seats and consequently the output of the non-legislative activities is overall 
smaller than in the case of Deputies. Regarding country effects, Italian parties ask 
significantly less emigration questions than the French MPs across all models. 
 
Emigration related legislative proposals 
The following four negative binomial regressions test the relevance of emigrant 
electoral support, party competition and the electoral system of emigrant representation 
for the number of emigration proposals made by each party (per chamber) in one 
legislature (table 6). Model 1 indicates that, similar to the analysis of non-legislative 
activities, emigrant electoral support is a stable and relevant predictor for emigration 
salience on parties’ legislative agendas (H1). In incidence ratios, one percent increase in 
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emigrant support increases the rate of emigration proposals by a factor of 1.05. 
Regarding the second hypothesis proposed, ideology is not significant for emigration 
salience in legislative proposals. However, the less close is the electoral competition, 
that is, the larger the distance between the most voted parties, the lower the degree of 
emigration salience on party parliamentary agendas, confirming H3. For a more 
intuitive understanding of this result we calculate incidence ratios and observe that one 
percentage increase in the distance between the main parties decreases the rate of 
emigration initiatives by a factor of 0.98   As in the case of parliamentary questions, an 
electoral system with special representation is a strong predictor of emigration salience 
in proposals, by increasing the rate of related initiatives in one legislature by a factor of 
5.00, a finding which confirms H4.  
Table 6. Determinants of volume of emigration related legislative proposals. Negative binomial 
coefficients with robust standard errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Emigrant electoral 
support 
0.047*** 0.026 0.047*** 0.045*** 
 (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.014) 
Ideology -0.045 -0.041 -0.046 -0.200* 
 (0.083) (0.082) (0.083) (0.114) 
Closeness of electoral 
competition 
-0.023* -0.019 -0.015 -0.022* 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) 
Special representation 1.609*** 0.839 1.899*** 0.315 
 (0.416) (0.567) (0.523) (0.836) 
Special representation# 
Emigrant electoral 
support 
 0.031*   
  (0.017)   
Special representation# 
Closeness of electoral 
competition 
  -0.014  
   (0.024)  
Special representation# 
Ideology 
   0.248* 
    (0.131) 
Size of party 0.028* 0.030* 0.028* 0.032** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) 
Party in government -0.192 -0.187 -0.192 -0.204 
 (0.186) (0.194) (0.194) (0.209) 
Senate -1.090*** -1.107*** -1.128*** -1.011*** 
 (0.215) (0.209) (0.217) (0.204) 
Legislature II -0.405 -0.362 -0.470 -0.359 
 (0.383) (0.386) (0.382) (0.405) 
Legislature III -0.020 -0.015 -0.144 0.004 
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 (0.384) (0.408) (0.393) (0.402) 
Spain 0.615 0.433 0.560 0.538 
 (0.629) (0.511) (0.647) (0.544) 
Romania -0.424 -0.342 -0.501 -0.300 
 (0.413) (0.414) (0.419) (0.459) 
Italy 0.224 0.480 0.116 0.245 
 (0.422) (0.452) (0.422) (0.427) 
Constant -0.669 -0.408 -0.657 -0.013 
 (0.576) (0.614) (0.580) (0.660) 
Alpha -0.077 -0.209 -0.075 -0.144 
 (0.390) (0.427) (0.389) (0.378) 
Observations 130 130 130 130 
AIC 413.851 412.311 415.671 411.770 
BIC 453.996 455.324 458.684 454.783 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Base categories: Legislature: Legislature 1; Country: France 
 *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Regarding the interaction between the electoral system and electoral incentives, the 
regression results indicate that electoral support has a stronger effect for parties in 
special representation contexts, confirming H5. Indeed, in this model electoral support 
is no longer significant in systems without special representation.  But, unlike the case 
of non-legislative activities, the closeness of the electoral competition among emigrant 
constituents does not have a different effect depending on the electoral system. These 
findings suggest that in contexts with special representation, those parties, which are the 
most popular among emigrants (and therefore have special emigrant representatives), 
are more likely to seek an enduring link with emigrant voters through the emphasis on 
emigration issues in their legislative activities. 
 
In order to contextualise these results, we calculate the predicted margins for various 
degrees of support and different configurations of electoral system. In contexts with 
special representation, the number of emigration related proposals increase from 1 to 9 
when the votes received from abroad by the respective party increase from 0 per cent to 
40 per cent. In contexts without special representation, the number of proposals 
increases from 0 to 2 when the votes from abroad increase from 0 to 40 per cent and is 
not statistically significant.    
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The control variables display somewhat similar patterns in the analysis of legislative 
activities as in the case of the non-legislative activities. The size of the party in the 
chamber has a positive effect. However, as Model 4 indicates, special representation 
systems also significantly modify the impact of party ideology on emigration salience in 
legislative proposals, albeit in a minimal way. Even though the coefficient of ideology 
is significant, the average marginal effects of ideology over the two types of electoral 
systems for emigrants are small and the confidence intervals cross 0. This means that 
we cannot decidedly establish if ideology has a positive or negative effect on the 
number of initiatives in any of the systems. Moreover, there are less emigration 
proposals found in the Senates which generally present a smaller volume of legislative 
proposals than the lower chambers. There are no significant differences between 
countries.  
 
Discussion and concluding remarks 
This paper set out to analyse which factors lead political parties in the country of origin 
to place more emphasis on emigration issues in parliamentary politics. An analysis of 
these processes is a timely contribution to the understanding of the transnational 
political link between emigrants and their homelands in the wake of the majority of 
world states enfranchising their non-resident citizens. As expected, external citizenship 
does not lead to equal attention to emigrants among political parties in the country of 
origin. We find strong evidence that those parties with more electoral support from the 
emigrants are more likely to prioritize emigrant related issues in their parliamentary 
activities. Moreover, close electoral races abroad increase the amount of attention 
dedicated to emigrant issues for legislative proposals. Further studies may explore the 
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causality of these electoral links. At this point it is important to emphasize that although 
such findings might be intuitive at the national level, the relative uncertainty and 
volatility of the transnational electoral field renders this link much less obvious.  
 
Importantly, the implementation of external electoral systems with special 
representation is accompanied by an increase in attention to external constituents among 
political parties in the homeland. In the case of parliamentary questions, the positive 
effect of special representation is reinforced by close electoral competition. This 
illustrates the different dynamics between the district level competition for special 
emigrant seats and the competition for the emigrant vote in legislative elections where 
the emigrant vote is counted as part of the general pool of votes in the country of origin. 
The drafting of emigration related bills displays a slightly different result, as the effect 
of special representation is stronger for parties who receive a larger share of votes from 
abroad. Together these findings suggest that the relationship between electoral 
competition, electoral support and party commitment to emigrant issues is more intense 
in systems with special emigrant representatives. 
 
The field of transnational linkages between parties and emigrants also raises the 
question of which conceptual framework may better capture these processes. In a 
broader dialogue with theories on issue salience and representation, our analysis makes 
a relevant contribution by bringing both parties and constituencies back in the 
theoretical debate on the linkage between electorates and parliaments. The present 
analysis proposes an explanatory framework for the study of party emphases on 
constituency related issues. This complements the literature on issue salience which 
usually focuses on topics such as welfare, environment or European integration, which 
 30 
are not related to a particular constituency. At the same time our focus on why parties 
pay attention to constituency issues contributes to representation theories, which are 
otherwise mainly concerned with the individual behaviour of MPs.  
 
Overall, this paper takes an important first step towards uncovering how electoral 
democracy works across borders between parties in the homeland and their voters 
residing abroad. The paper shows that the enfranchisement of emigrants does not 
automatically lead to more attentiveness to their plight by the political parties in the 
country of origin. Instead, despite the marginality of the emigrant vote, the cross border 
patterns of attention by parties to emigrants are related to some of the basic 
institutionalist conditions and strategic choices that also characterize issue salience and 
substantive representation on the domestic party political scene.  
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1 Data for the Romanian Senate and legislative proposals in the first legislature 
of the French National Assembly are unfortunately not available in an online format.  
2 For further analysis of the Spanish emigrant vote see Lugilde (2007).  
3 For the sake of simplicity, we use the term parliamentary questions, although 
the numbers include interpellations as well. 
4 For instance, in the case of Spain, MPs may submit the same question 
repeatedly only changing the name of the country of residence of Spanish emigrants or 
 33 
                                                                                                                                          
district of origin. We have grouped these questions together. Moreover, we have run the 
same regressions with these repetitions and the significance does not change. 
5 The information in the parliamentary database of the French Senate is ordered 
per parliamentary group only. However, these parliamentary groups largely coincide 
with the parties except for a smallish group of non-affiliated deputies and senators 
6 We have adapted the rolling elections in the French Senate to the legislative 
election dates of the National Assembly by averaging the electoral support of the AFE 
within those periods.  
7 A small number of parties in our dataset are missing from the CHES dataset. 
We have estimated their ideology scores based on primary sources (party web page, 
latest electoral manifesto) and secondary sources (ParlGov and Comparative Manifesto 
project). These parties are: France: Mouvement des citoyens (4). Italy: Per l’Italia nell 
Mondo (8), Associazione Italia Sud America (5), Movimento Associativo per Italiani 
nell Estero (5.33). Spain: Iniciativa per Catalunya Verts (3). Romania: National 
Minorities (5). 
8 Such dummies might also help control for systemic differences generated by 
the parliamentary search engines across the different cases 
Table 1. Main characteristics of the emigrant electorate and electoral system in France, Italy, Romania and Spain	  
Country Emigrants  Main regions and countries of 
residence  
Voting rights 
since 
Special emigrant 
representatives since 
Turnout,  recent 
elections 
Voting pattern 
Emigrant 
voters 
 
% over total 
electorate 
France 1611054  Europe (Switzerland, UK), North 
America, Middle East (Israel), North 
Africa (Morocco)  
1981 presidential 2008 (2012) National 
Assembly:  11 MPs 
39,1 %  in 2012 
(presidential) 
20,9 % in 2012 
(legislative) 
More support for 
centre right  until 2012 
 1067000 2008 legislative 1958 Senate: 12 MPs 
 2,3 
Italy 4341156 Europe (Germany, Switzerland) South 
America (Argentina), North America. 
Australia. 
 
2001 (first 
election 2006) 
2001 (2006) Chamber of 
Deputies: 12 MPs 
31,6 % in 2013 
(legislative, Chamber of 
Deputies) 
 
More support for the 
centre left  
3494687 2001 (2006) Senate: 6 
MPs 
  7,5 
Romania  3007350* Europe (Italy, Spain), North America 1991 presidential 2008 Chamber of 
Deputies: 4 MPs 
147,754 voters in 2009 
(presidential) 
Volatile 
2007 legislative 2008 Senate: 2 MPs 61,014  in 2012  
(legislative) 
Spain 1702778 South America (Argentina) Europe 
(France, Germany) 
1978 Congress: None 31,74 % in 2008  
 
5% in 2011 
Always vote for 
incumbent party 
 1482786 
 
4,1 Senate: None 
 
Own elaboration from: Ellis et al (2007); http://www.idea.int/vt/; France: Rapport du Gouvernement sur la situation des Français établis hors de France 2012; 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr;  http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats Italy: http://elezionistorico.interno.it/; AIRE, http://servizidemografici.interno.it; 
Romania: http://www.becparlamentare2012.ro/: http://www.bec2009p.ro; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013). Trends in International 
Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin, Spain: Pere, http://www.ciudadaniaexterior.empleo.gob.es; http://www.infoelectoral.interior.es/min/. *Due to the 
lack of registration of Romanian voters abroad we only have the number first generation Romanians abroad and the turnout is in absolute numbers. Numbers of 
emigrants, registered voters and turnout is from the last election within the period studied.  
